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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Medical Waste, A Loaded Gun on the
Verge of Firing: United States v. Plaza
Health Laboratories, Inc.i
ANN M. BABIGIAN*
I. Introduction
"Infectious waste is essentially a loaded gun and should
be legally recognized as such .... In New York, unlicensed
possession of a loaded gun is a felony because it [is] ludicrous
to have to follow criminals around until they shoot someone.
The same logic certainly must apply to environmental
crimes."2
The illegal disposal of infectious medical waste first in-
trigued Americans during the summer of 1987. 3 Throughout
that summer, syringes, vials of blood, hypodermic needles,
and other medical waste washed up along the shores of the
1. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'g sub nom. United States v. Villegas, 784
F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
* B.A. Providence College, 1993; J.D. Pace University School of Law,
1996. The author wishes to thank her parents, her sister Michelle, and David
Wildgoose for their love and support. Also, thanks to Jeff Pasquarella and other
members of the PELR who edited this piece.
2. Michael Weisskopf, Hodgepodge of State Laws, Lack of U.S. Statute
Abet Medical Waste Problem, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 10, 1988, at A17
(quoting Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman's statement to a House
subcommittee).
3. See Medical Waste, Raw Garbage Force N.J. Beaches to Close, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 15, 1987, at 3 (discussing how the beaches along the Atlantic Coast were
closed as a result of the presence of a fifty mile long band of hospital waste and
raw garbage); Sally Squires, Local Hospitals Grapple With Waste Problem;
Even a Definition of 'Infectious' Proves Elusive, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 30,
1988, at Z06.
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Northeast seacoast.4 These incidents not only closed many of
the beautiful beaches along the coast but, more shockingly,
instilled a great public fear of a new health hazard. 5 Gero-
nimo Villegas, co-owner and vice president of Plaza Health
Laboratories, Inc., was one of the culprits responsible for the
illegal disposal of infectious medical waste into the Nation's
waters.6
The discharge of a pollutant into the navigable waters of
the United States is prohibited unless compliance is achieved
under the provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 7 One
problematic area is whether pollution is discharged from a
point source. In United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc.,8
(Plaza Health), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in acquitting the defendant,9 held that, in a
criminal context, a person is not a point source under the
CWA by virtue of the rule of lenity. 10 The problematic issue
in Plaza Health was the court's reluctance to broaden the def-
inition of the term "point source" in a criminal prosecution
under the CWA. Although Plaza Health is well recognized for
the Second Circuit's failure to make the logical leap of finding
a person to be a point source under the CWA, it must also be
noted that the court failed to recognize that the pollutants'
discharge resulted from any one of a number of possible
"point sources" defined in the CWA. The Plaza Health court
failed to recognize either the container(s), the vials, the bulk-
head, the car, or a human body to be a point source from
which Villegas discharged pollutants. Furthermore, since the
court should have found that the infected blood was dis-
4. Laura Carlan Battle, Note Regulation of Medical Waste in the United
States, 11 PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 517, 543 (1994).
5. See, e.g., supra note 3.
6. See United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
7. See Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act (CWA) §§ 101-
607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1994).
8. 3 F.3d 643.
9. Id. at 649.
10. The rule of lenity provides that where language in a statute is ambigu-
ous, the ambiguity should be resolved in defendant's favor. See discussion infra
part II.C.4.A.
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charged from a point source, it should also have elevated Vil-
legas' punishment to a criminal violation under the CWA's
knowing endangerment provision."
The evidence, when viewed in totality, clearly points to
one conclusion: Villegas was well aware that some of the
blood he discharged into the Hudson River was infected with
a deadly virus. The Second Circuit, along with other courts,
must look to the general approach of the CWA as a whole,
including its objectives, policy, and statutory language, to ef-
fectuate the goals of the statute. 12 If courts fail to apply such
an approach, the ramifications could pose a serious threat to
the safety of the Nation's waters.
This Case Note analyzes the Plaza Health decision by ex-
amining the relevant statutory provisions and case law, the
court's methodology, the flaws of the decision, as well as its
conceivable impact. Further, this Case Note proposes a dif-
ferent analysis as to how the Plaza Health court should have
reached a more favorable decision in light of the goals of the
CWA. Part I explores the legislative history and relevant pro-
visions of the CWA, and the pertinent case law. Part II dis-
cusses the Plaza Health decision, focusing on both the district
and circuit courts' decisions, and the convincing Second Cir-
cuit dissent. Part III analyzes the Second Circuit's flaws and
suggests a basis to find Villegas liable under the CWA. Addi-
tionally, Part III proffers the idea that Villegas should have
been held in violation of the knowing endangerment provi-
sion of the CWA which heightens punishment. Finally, this
Case Note outlines other potential ramifications under the
Plaza Health decision.
II. Background
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, water pollution control was led by the States
while the role of Federal agencies was limited. 13 This ap-
11. See CWA § 309(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
12. United States v. Gratz, No. 92-141, 1993 WL 19733, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 25, 1993).
13. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972: GEN-
ERAL STATEMENT, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in
1996] 1065
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proach sought to "'protect the public health or welfare' and
'enhance the quality of water' through adoption and enforce-
ment, primarily by the states, of 'water quality standards'."14
However, this system proved to be inadequate, since it pos-
sessed a limited, unclear scope, suffered from administrative
problems, and lacked a permitting process. 15
Thereafter, it was determined that a nationwide ap-
proach, in conjunction with a permit program based on fed-
eral minimum effluent criteria enforceable directly against
dischargers, would be more successful. 16 Although the pro-
posed legislation initially failed to pass, Congress enacted the
Refuse Act Permit Program in 1970 (Refuse Act).' 7 This stat-
ute, originally designed to protect navigation, prohibited all
discharges into navigable waters unless a permit was ob-
tained, thereby requiring industrial dischargers to obtain
permits or face the threat of prosecution.' 8 Unfortunately,
within two years of its enactment, it was clear that the Re-
fuse Act "reached a point of stalemate."I9
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669. Federal agencies were authorized to provide
support for research, projects, and financial assistance. Id. This standard, de-
rived from the Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, ch. 750, 62 Stat. 1155,
was "the first precursor to the present federal water pollution control statute,
the Clean Water Act." Russell V. Randle & Suzanne R. Schaeffer, Water Pollu-
tion, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 147 (Timothy A. Vanderver et al. eds.,
1994).
14. J. Gordon Arbuckle & Timothy A. Vanderver, Jr., Water Pollution Con-
trol, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 81 (J. Gordon Arbuckle et al. eds., 7th
ed. 1983).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 82.
17. Id. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
18. Arbuckle & Vanderver, supra note 14, at 82. The statute, originally en-
titled the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, is presently known as Protection of
Navigable Waters and of Harbors and Rivers Improvements. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-
467 (1987) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat.
1151). This statute was designed to prohibit discharges from ship or shore in-
stallation(s) into the navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 407.
Also, the Act prohibited discharges which had the potential to flow into naviga-
ble waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467.
19. Arbuckle & Vanderver, supra note 14, at 82. The permit program had
many deficiencies: (1) no permit standards for the grant or denial thereof were
promulgated; (2) the Act was inapplicable to the major pollution source: munici-
pal sewers; (3) administration was ineffective; and, (4) the relationship between
the Act and the modern environmental statutes was vague. Id. Ultimately,
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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In 1972, over President Nixon's veto, Congress promul-
gated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,20 more com-
monly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), seeking to
combine aspects of water quality standards and technology-
based approaches. 21 The basis of pollution prevention and
elimination is achieved by applying effluent limitations,
where the program's effectiveness and performance is mea-
sured by water quality.22 The CWA's objective is "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters"23 through national goals and policies
by focusing on industrial and municipal dischargers. With
the passage of the CWA, Congress placed limits on what in-
dustries could discharge and, thus, for the first time, firms
were required to use progressive control technology.24
To reach these goals and thereby limit discharges, Con-
gress implemented the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES).25 Under this system, a person must
apply for and obtain a permit before discharging pollutants
into navigable waters of the United States from any point
these deficiencies proved to be fatal. Id. However, the Act's program is consid-
ered a major milestone regarding the regulation of industrial dischargers
through the implementation of a permit program. Id.
20. CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
21. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AMENDMENTS OF 1972: GENERAL
STATEMENT, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set
these standards, considering the "technological capability and [the] cost of pol-
lution control technology." Randle & Schaeffer, supra note 13, at 148.
22. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 13, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675.
Water quality, as opposed to effluent limitations, is not a method of elimination
and enforcement. Id. The term "effluent limitation" refers to a restriction es-
tablished by a State or Administrator on quantitative amounts of pollutants
which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters. CWA § 502(11),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
23. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). See also S. REP. No. 414, supra note
13, reprinted in, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674.
24. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1990). The CWA established "technology-based" limitations; thus, the CWA
mandated all sources to employ the "best practicable control technology cur-
rently available" to control pollution before permits are issued for any dis-
charge. See CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
25. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.1, 122.2 (1981).
1996] 1067
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source.26 NPDES permits are issued only for discharges of
pollutants from point sources.27 Thus, to establish a violation
under the CWA, a plaintiff must show that a defendant: (1)
discharged (2) a pollutant (3) into the navigable waters of the
United States (4) from a point source (5) without a discharge
permit. 28
A. Terminology
"Pollutants" are biological materials (e.g. medical waste),
solid waste, garbage, chemical waste, or industrial waste.29
The illegal disposal of medical waste has sparked much con-
troversy over the years due to its high-risk nature. Conse-
quently, in 1988, Congress enacted the Medical Waste
Tracking Act (MWTA).30 The MWTA was prompted by the
infamous medical waste wash-ups along the shores of the
Northeast seacoast during the preceding summer which trig-
gered public fears of a new health hazard.31 Such wastes con-
sisted of syringes, blood vials, rubber gloves, hypodermic
needles, and blood bags.3 2 Unfortunately, the MWTA and its
implementations expired in June, 1991. 3 3 Today, the CWA is
one of a few statutes governing the disposal of medical
waste.34
26. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
27. Id. §§ 402, 502(12), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1362(12).
28. Id. §§ 301(a), 502(12), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12). "Navigable wa-
ters" refers to the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.
CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
29. CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Other types of pollutants enumer-
ated in the CWA include equipment, rock, sand, sewage, and cellar dirt. Id.
However, the term "pollutant" is not limited to what was enumerated in the
text of the CWA.
30. Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6992-6992K). The four main features of the MWTA were (1) defining medi-
cal waste, (2) providing for a tracking system, (3) information gathering power
and requirements, and (4) enforcement capabilities. Id.
31. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
32. Battle, supra note 4, at 543.
33. Id.
34. Other federal statutes governing the disposal of medical waste are the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6922k (1988 & Supp. IV 1994), the Marine Protection Research and
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) §§ 2-205, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988 & Supp. IV
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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Due to its stature, medical waste is classified as infec-
tious medical waste and defined by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) as "pathogens with sufficient virulence
and quantity so that exposure to the waste by a susceptible
host could result in an infectious disease."3 5 More simply, it
is waste that is capable of producing infectious disease.
36
Human blood and blood products are included in the infec-
tious waste category under EPA standards.37 Interestingly,
medical waste-related injuries are unlikely to occur when
blood is infected with Hepatitis-B or the HIV virus. This is
due to the fact that the virus must survive inside a living cell
in order to multiply, and removal from that living cell results
in the virus' numbers to either remain constant or decline.38
Thus, viral numbers will never increase outside a living cell.
The CWA defines the "discharge of a pollutant" as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source."3 9 A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
1994), and the Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-617, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988
& Supp. IV 1994). Both, the CWA and the MPRSA not only protect the integrity
of the water, but also prevent beach wash-ups of medical waste. See Battle,
supra note 4, at 555. The CAA specifically addresses the incineration of medi-
cal waste. See Battle, supra note 4, at 559. See also CAA § 129(a)(1)(C), 42
U.S.C. § 7429(a)(1)(C). For a more comprehensive understanding of how the
CAA regulates medical waste, see Battle, supra note 4, at 559.
35. Battle, supra note 4, at 524.
36. 40 C.F.R. § 259.10 (1994). See also Battle, supra note 4, at 524.
37. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDE FOR INFEC-
TIOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 2-2 (1986).
38. William A. Rutala & David J. Weber, Infectious Waste-Mismatch Be-
tween Science and Policy, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 578 (Aug. 22, 1991).
[For infection to happen a chain of events must occur: a person
must come into contact with medical waste; an injury must follow,
thereby creating a portal of entry (or a portal of entry must already
exist); a sufficient number of viable infectious agents must enter a
susceptible host via the portal; infection can then occur, but does
not always result in disease ... . '[Aln infectious organism's ability
to survive outside a host varies widely and, consequently, its capa-
bility to transmit disease varies greatly, depending on its type and
form and environmental factors such as temperature and moisture.'
Battle, supra note 4, at 533-34 (citations omitted).
39. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).
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container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding opera-
tion, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
are or may be discharged."40 An addition can occur from or
through a point source since EPA regulations define a "dis-
charge of pollutants" to include surface run-off that is col-
lected or channeled by man.41 The term "point source" has
historically caused substantial controversy in decision-mak-
ing regarding the CWA. These controversies arise due to the
lack of guidance from the legislative history and statutory
definitions. 42
The CWA primarily focuses on point source discharges
since they are identifiable. 43 For ease of regulation, "point
source" alone was included in the definition of "discharge of
pollutant."44 In contrast, "nonpoint source" pollution is not
the result of a "discharge" or an "addition," but rather is the
result of surface run-off.45 "Nonpoint sources," although a
major source of pollution, are multiple and unidentifiable
sources and, thus, difficult to control.46 "Point sources" are
40. Id. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. 1362(14) (emphasis added).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) rev'g 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982).
42. Nowhere in the CWA's legislative history does Congress discuss what it
envisioned as a point source. The fact that the statutory language is not pre-
cise, in conjunction with the lack of legislative history, gives rise to the present
controversies surrounding the term "point source."
43. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d at 1316.
44. See generally, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
834 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1987) affg and rev'g in part 659 F. Supp. 1441 (D.
Or. 1987).
45. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 849 n.9. When read in
totality, the CWA portrays more than Congress' intent to clean up polluted wa-
ters of the United States; it depicts the realization of "economic, technological,
and political limits of total elimination of all pollution from all sources." Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 693 F.2d at 178 (emphasis added).
46. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.
1979). The Earth Sciences court held a discharge from a reserve pump in a gold
extraction process was deemed a point source, regardless of whether the "source
of the excess liquid [was either] rainfall or snow melt." Id. at 374. For a com-
prehensive analysis of non-point sources, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, Can It Be Done?, 65 CH.-KENT L. REV. 479
(1989).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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subject to federal regulation and enforcement under the
CWA, while nonpoint sources are not.
47
The CWA's definition of "discharge of pollutant" refers to
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source,"48 thereby indicating the Congressional intent
to prohibit all violations, including minor ones. Furthermore,
"point source" should not be separated from the phrase "addi-
tion of any pollutant."49 Moreover, it should not be discon-
nected from the phrase "discharge of pollutant," since
focusing solely on the term "point source" can lead to absurd
results which fail to promote the purpose of the CWA.
50
The point source is the object which introduces the pollu-
tant into the water from the outside world.51 In this respect,
courts have interpreted the phrase "any point source"
broadly, without limitation, mindful of Congressional in-
tent.52 Congress intended the definition of a "point source" to
have broad meaning, "as it should be given its contemplated
applicability to literally thousands of pollution sources. To
cast such definitions in absolute, unequivocable terms would
be unrealistic, if not altogether impossible."53 The CWA per-
mit program covers all point sources, not only those specifi-
cally identified in the CWA, but also "major sources, easily
47. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 849; see also National
Wildlife Fed'n, 693 F.2d 156.
48. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).
49. Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 629 (D. R.I. 1990)
(where homeowners brought a citizens suit against the owners of a septic sys-
tem which polluted their homes and the Sakonet River, claiming such owners
were the point source).
50. Id.
51. National Wildlife Fed'n, 693 F.2d at 175.
52. See infra notes 62-67, 71-74 and accompanying text.
53. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 1979).
In Earth Sciences, the court found
[t]he concept of a point source was designed to further this scheme
by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable
conveyance from which pollutants might enter the waters of the
United States. It is clear from the legislative history Congress
would have regulated so-called nonpoint sources if a workable
method could have been derived; it instructed the EPA to study the
problem and come up with a solution.
599 F.2d at 373.
10711996]
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controlled point sources, or point sources in the traditional
sense."54 If a pollutant is "conveyed or channelled," it is con-
sidered a point source discharge subject to the NPDES. 5
Moreover, the point source need not discharge a pollutant di-
rectly into navigable waters.56 This is because there is no re-
quirement for a point source to be directly adjacent to the
water it pollutes. 57
Any discernible, 58 confined5 9 and discrete60 conveyance, 61
is a point source under the CWA.62 The "discrete conveyance"
definition is so inclusive that it encompasses those discharges
not explicitly enumerated in the CWA.63 For example, vari-
ous courts have held the following to be point sources: a rail-
road culvert,64 a reserve pump,65 a dam,66 a leachate
54. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.4(a), 376 (1977).
See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393
(D.D.C. 1975), affd Bub nom., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
55. Gratz, No. 92-141, 1993 WL 19733, at *7. See generally, O'Leary v.
Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that dis-
charges from overflowing ponds, collection-tank bypasses, gullies, trenches,
ditches, broken dirt berms, and collection-tank cracks and defects all consti-
tuted point source discharges).
56. United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 947 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976). In Velsicol Chem. Corp., the court found that discharges into a
city sewer system, which emptied into the Mississippi River, were a violation of
the CWA, since the defendants knew or should have known that the system led
directly into the river. Id. Furthermore, the court determined this interpreta-
tion of the CWA was in line with Congress' intent to apply the CWA to its
broadest limits. Id.
57. O'Leary, 523 F. Supp. at 655.
58. "Discernible" is something which is recognizable or identifiable. WEB-
STER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 322 (8th ed. 1979).
59. "Confined" refers to something which is restricted. Id. at 235.
60. "Discrete" means individually distinct. Id. at 323.
61. A "conveyance" refers to a means or way of conveying or transporting.
Id. at 246.
62. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
63. Gratz, No. 92-141, 1993 WL 19733, at *8.
64. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
65. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374.
66. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13
F.3d 305, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, _ U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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collection system,67 a cattle feedlot, 68 and a break in a berm
around a field.69 Furthermore, a "point source" does not nec-
essarily consist of physical and functional characteristics,
7 0
which are typically envisioned when one contemplates the
type of point sources enumerated under the CWA, such as a
pipe or a tunnel.7 1 However, the CWA identifies floating craft
and rolling stock as point sources, although they are mobile
sources which fail to evoke the image of a permanent, func-
tional structure.7 2 In addition, courts have recognized a
dump truck,73 a bulldozer and a backhoe,7 4 a liquid manure
spreading vehicle, 75 an airplane and a ship 76 as point sources.
B. Liability
The term "point source" does not determine a source for
liability purposes; rather, the liability rests on the person(s)
in control of the addition of pollution into water.77 To punish
and deter violations, the CWA imposes civil and criminal pen-
67. Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir.
1980).
68. Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991).
69. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod. Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852,
854 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
70. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1354.
71. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
72. Id.
73. United States v. Tul, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983), aftd, 769
F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985) rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); United
States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
74. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th
Cir. 1983). A bulldozer was also held to be a point source in Tull, 615 F. Supp.
at 622, and in Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1337.
75. Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) rev'g 834 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, __
U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995). The court also held that a liquid manure
spreading operations area was a point source because a farm falls within the
definition of a concentrated animal feeding operation, which is one of the
sources enumerated under the CWA. Id. at 123. Here, the collection of liquid
manure directly flowed into navigable waters. Id. See supra note 68 and ac-
companying text.
76. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 309 (1982).
77. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d at 45. In Abston, Defendants, who
operated a strip mining plant, placed their excess in highly erodible piles that
were carried away by rain water. Id. at 46-47. The court found that the CWA
does not relieve the miners from liability if"they are reasonably likely to be the
11
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alties against any person who violates its provisions. 78 In
particular, criminal offenses are categorized as negligent vio-
lations, knowing violations, or knowing endangerment viola-
tions. 79  This categorization is significant because a
defendant can be found liable without a showing of intent.80
The Water Quality Control Act (WQCA) of 1987, which
revised the CWA in part, revised § 309(c), thereby increasing
criminal penalties under the CWA. 81 However, under
§ 309(d), violators are subject to civil penalties no greater
than $25,000 per day per violation. 82 This section was writ-
ten without regard to a discharger's intent, thus making the
discharger strictly liable for civil penalties. In contrast, a dis-
charger's intent becomes relevant when an action is for crimi-
nal penalties.8 3 Negligent and knowing violations may be
punished separately or concurrently under the criminal
provision.8 4
means by which pollutants are ultimately disposed into a navigable body of
water." Id. at 45.
78. CWA § 309(c)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)-(d). Violators penalized under the
civil penalties provision, shall be subject to a fine, not exceeding more than
$25,000 per day per violation. Id. § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). In determining
the penalty amount, the court shall consider: (1) the seriousness of the viola-
tion; (2) economic benefits which arise by virtue of the violation; (3) the viola-
tor's good-faith effort to comply with the CWA; (4) the penalty's economic impact
on the violator; and (5) other matters justice so requires. Id.
79. CWA § 309(c)(1)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(3).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 618
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant's specific intent is not required to con-
stitute a violation, since the CWA punishes both negligent and willful
misconduct).
81. See also Shahrzad Heyat, et al., Note, Environmental Crimes, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 475, 509 (1994).
82. CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
83. See CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
84. CWA § 309(c)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2). Negligent violators shall
be
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year,
or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of such a person... punishment shall be by a fine of not
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not
more than 2 years, or by both.
Id. § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). In addition, if a person is convicted of a
first offense for knowingly violating the CWA, that person is subject either to a
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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The knowing endangerment provision heightens the
punishment of unlawful dischargers by allowing felony penal-
ties to be imposed for life threatening conduct 8 5 The provi-
sion requires not only that the discharger possess a knowing
mens rea, but also requires that the discharger "know[ ] at
that time he thereby places another person in imminent dan-
ger of death or serious bodily injury."8 6 Additional provisions
under the knowing endangerment section, such as affirma-
tive defenses, are useful in determining whether an individ-
ual shall be subject to its penalties.8 7
In determining whether an individual defendant knew
his conduct subjected another person to imminent danger, a
person is held responsible for the actual awareness or actual
belief he possessed. 8 Furthermore, the use of circumstantial
evidence is permissible to establish the requisite mens rea.8 9
The legislative history of the knowing endangerment provi-
sion indicates that Congress intended the "knowledge" ele-
ment to be measured by prevailing case law standards.90
Unfortunately, there is no guidance as to applying or ascer-
taining the knowing element of the provision.91
$50,000 per day of violation or up to three years imprisonment, or both. Id.
§ 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). The penalty for further violation of the
knowing provision subjects a person to either a fine of up to $100,000 per day of
violation or up to six years of imprisonment, or both. Id.
85. See CWA § 309(c)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
86. Id. Serious bodily injury refers to bodily injury involving a substantial
risk of death. Id. § 309(c)(3)(B)(iv), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(iv).
87. Id. § 309(c)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(3)(B).
88. CWA § 309(c)(3)(B)(i)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(I).
89. Id. § 309(c)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i).
90. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985).
91. Besides Villegas and Plaza Health, only two cases mention the knowing
endangerment provision. See United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir.
1992); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 907 (1991). In Borowski, the First Circuit held that prosecution under the
knowing endangerment provision cannot be based on the danger which ensues
prior to the time the pollutant reaches a municipal waste water treatment facil-
ity. 977 F.2d at 32. Here, the employee, who handled pollutants on the prem-
ises from which the discharge originated was exposed, and the manufacturer of
the optical mirrors, could not be prosecuted under the knowing endangerment
provision of the CWA for the exposure. Id. In Rutana, the CEO and part owner
of a metal finishing plant illegally discharged sulfuric and nitric acid into a city
sewer line which, in turn, injured city employees. 932 F.2d at 1156-57. Rutana
10751996]
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A "person" under the criminal penalties section extends
the definition set forth under the CWA, which includes "any
responsible corporate officer."92 Similarly, many courts have
held the following corporate officers are responsible for CWA
violations: the president and secretary of a company;93 the
manager of a manufacturing plant;94 the foreman for a ma-
rina who discharged gasoline;95 and the fuel director of a na-
val station.96
III. United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.97
A. Facts
Geronimo Villegas was the co-owner and vice president
of Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., a facility in Brooklyn, New
York, that tests blood for disease and other medical condi-
tions.98 On two occasions between April and September
1988, Villegas deposited numerous vials of blood, handled by
his firm, in various containers. 99 Then Villegas, via his car,
transferred these containers from his Brooklyn office to his
residence at the Admirals Walk Condominium Complex in
Edgewater, New Jersey. 00 On the first occasion, Villegas set
the containers along the shoreline of the Hudson River.1' 1
On the second occasion, during low tide, Villegas placed two
primarily dealt with the sentencing of a defendant and did not apply or further
ascertain the mens rea element of the knowing endangerment provision. Id. at
1158. See also infra notes 136-147 and accompanying text.
92. CWA § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). The CWA defines a person as
"an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State.... ." CWA § 502(5),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).
93. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 272-73 (E.D. Pa.
1978), aft'd, 602 F.2d 1123, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
94. United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 1991).
95. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1977).
96. United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946, 948-49 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 177 (1993). Likewise, a president and general man-
ager of a company were charged with violating the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
97. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'g sub nom. United States v. Villegas, 784
F. Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
98. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 7.
99. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 633-34.
100. Id. at 644.
101. Id.
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containers within the crevice of a bulkhead below the high
tide line.102
On May 26, 1988, a group of eighth graders attended a
field trip at the Alice Austin House located in Staten Island,
New York, adjacent to the Hudson River.'03 As the children
played along the river's shore, they discovered numerous
glass vials appearing to contain human blood. 10 4 The stu-
dents not only found the vials washed up on the shore, but
also vials lying in the water, cracked vials, and vials placed in
ziplock bags. 10 5 Later that afternoon, a New York City sani-
tation worker collected approximately seventy more vials of
blood that were scattered along the shoreline and bobbing in
the water.106 It was later determined that five of these vials
contained blood infected with the Hepatitis-B virus.
10 7
On September 25, 1988, an Admirals Walk maintenance
worker discovered a plastic container consisting of vials of
human blood, settled between the rocks of the bulkhead adja-
cent to Villegas' condominium complex.' 0 8 The Edgewater
Police Department collected approximately one hundred vials
floating in the river or packed in plastic bags fixed in the
bulkhead.'0 9 Fifty-five of those vials were tested for infec-
tious disease; five vials were infected with the Hepatitis-B
virus.110
Based on the information recorded on the vial labels,
state investigators traced the vials of blood to Plaza Health
Laboratories."' When Villegas was confronted by the inves-
tigators regarding their findings, he admitted to placing the
102. Id.
103. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 644.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 7.
107. Id. This virus causes inflammation of the liver and can induce chronic
illness, such as cancer or, more seriously, can be fatal. See supra notes 35-37
and accompanying text.
108. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 644.
109. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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containers in the bulkhead, blaming his actions on the lack of
space in his laboratory for incoming blood samples. 112
B. The District Court's Decision 113
1. Point Source
In United States v. Villegas (Villegas), the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York addressed whether Vil-
legas could be found criminally liable under the CWA for his
actions. 114 Under the CWA, it is an offense for "any 'person'
to 'discharge' a 'pollutant' into 'navigable waters' from a 'point
source."' 115 Villegas argued that he could not be prosecuted
under the CWA since a point source is a physical structure
through which pollutants are discharged into water by an in-
dividual. 1 6 Therefore, since he placed the containers into
the Hudson River without using a conveyance, as required
under the CWA, Villegas claimed he could not be found liable
under the CWA. 117
The district court held "common sense, precedent and
legislative history" all indicate that a person should be con-
sidered a point source under the CWA. 1a In supporting its
proposition, the court analyzed 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), which
defines point sources as "any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited to any... discrete
fissure, container . . . from which pollutants are or may be
discharged."119 The court reasoned that the general term
"conveyance" clearly demonstrates Congress' desire to have
this word interpreted broadly. 120 This concept is demon-
strated by the definition of conveyance itself, as "a means or
way of conveying," which is applicable to any conduit of
waste.121
112. Id.
113. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6.
114. Id. at 6.
115. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
116. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 8.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 8.
121. Id. at 8-9.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/35
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Furthermore, the court relied on Congress' intentional
usage of the term "point source," as distinguished from a
"nonpoint source," to demonstrate that point sources consist
of deliberate discharges of pollutants and, therefore, must in-
clude discharges of pollutants by a person. 122 The term
"point source" was created to distinguish between the deliber-
ate discharge of pollutants and a mere ground erosion from
pollution that has been collected or confined. 123 This distinc-
tion led the district court to conclude that the CWA, when
read literally, includes discharges by individuals. 24 The
court reasoned that although the phrase "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance" does not evoke an image of
a person, the phrase clearly does not bar one.125
Although the examples of point sources, highlighted in
the definition, all represent physical structures, the court de-
termined that such an implication is not dispositive.' 26 In
Gooch v. United States, 27 the United States Supreme Court
held that the rule of ejusdem generis defeats the CWA's objec-
tives of preventing unregulated pollution from navigable wa-
ters.128 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Earth Sciences129 (Earth Sciences), held that the "concept of a
point source was designed to further this scheme by embrac-
ing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable convey-
ance from which pollutants might enter waters of the United
States." 30 Thus, the Villegas court concluded it would be
preposterous not to find Villegas liable under the CWA
122. Id. at 9. A nonpoint source is a situation where naturally induced run-
offs by rainfall cause pollutant discharges. Id. citing Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d
at 373.
123. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 9.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
128. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 9. The rule of ejusdem generis is a canon of
statutory construction. It applies when "general words follow the enumeration
of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying
only to things of the same general class as those enumerated." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).
129. 599 F.2d at 373.
130. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 9.
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merely because he himself dumped the blood vials into the
Hudson River instead of discharging the pollutants from a
physical conveyance. 131
In its analysis, the court recognized Congress' apprehen-
sion in finding everyday people that carelessly litter in navi-
gable waters liable under the CWA. 132 In addressing this
issue, the court looked to the CWA's main objective, which is
to protect the Nation's waters from the ill effects of waste dis-
charged by industrial polluters. 13 3 In consideration of this
objective, the court focused upon the CWA's emphasis on the
discharge of pollutants produced by waste-generating activi-
ties. 34 In turn, the court determined that this definition
places the inquiry on whether Villegas "deliberately engaged
in threatening the 'chemical, physical and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters' . . . which is the object of the Clean
Water Act, and not whether the conduit for such activity was
a human being or an inanimate structure."135
Finally, the court held that regardless of whether Ville-
gas constituted a point source, the rocks forming the bulk-
head at his condominium were "discrete fissure[s]" which are
enumerated in the CWA as a point source. 13 6 This was be-
cause the rocks constituted a natural structure which had the
physical capacity to retain pollutants. 137 Even if the rocks
forming the bulkhead did not constitute a point source, the
court held that the containers holding the vials were point
sources, since a container is clearly enumerated in the CWA's
definition of a point source.' 38
2. Knowing Endangerment
The district court upheld Villegas' contention that even if
he is guilty of discharging a pollutant from a point source, the
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 10.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 11.
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evidence failed to establish that he violated the knowing en-
dangerment provision of the CWA. 1' 9 This provision places
criminal liability on "[a]ny person who knowingly violates
section 1311 ... of this title ... and who knows at that time
that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury ... 140
Under this section, a defendant must act with an "'actual
awareness' or an 'actual belief that he is placing another per-
son in imminent danger."1 41 This "actual awareness or be-
lief' can be proven through circumstantial evidence. 142
Furthermore, the district court noted that the CWA's legisla-
tive history regarding this issue was drawn from the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).143 Section
3008(f)(1)(c) of RCRA states "(1) A person's state of mind is
knowing with respect to... (c) a result of his conduct, if he is
aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to
cause danger of death or serious bodily injury."144
The Senate Report on the CWA's knowing endangerment
provision states that the above emphasized language was left
out of the CWA because of the language's tendency to deter
prosecutions. 145 By leaving the "substantially certain" lan-
guage out of the CWA's knowing endangerment provision, the
Senate Committee reasoned that the "knowledge" provision
should be measured according to the prevailing case law.146
Since the district court deemed the prevailing case law
unclear, it noted several interpretations of "substantial cer-
tainty."147 The court analyzed the culpability standards of
139. Id.
140. Id., quoting CWA § 309(c)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
141. Id.
142. CWA § 309 (c)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B).
143. RCRA §§ 1002-11012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922k (1988 & Supp. 1V 1994).
144. Id. § 3008(f)(1)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
145. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 11, noting S. REP. No. 50, supra note 90.
146. Id. At the time this case was decided at the district court level, only one
case discussed the knowing endangerment provision, but it did not apply or
further ascertain the mens rea element. See United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d
1152 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 (1991). See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
147. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 12.
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knowing endangerment under the MWTA. 148 The district
court looked to the Model Penal Code and the United States
Sentencing Commission's approach to violations of the provi-
sion, and concluded that a "high probability" standard affords
an appropriate alternative to the substantial certainty test
rejected by Congress.149 The "high probability" standard,
although lower than RCRA's "substantial certainty" stan-
dard, corresponds with the purpose of the knowing endanger-
ment provision.'50
The language of § 309(c)(3)(A) implies that a person who
discharges the pollutants "must actually place another per-
son in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and
not merely that such a result be a 'potential' consequence of
the defendant's act."' 5 ' The district court, by applying the
aforementioned standard, concluded that "imminent danger"
must mean danger resulting as a high probability of the con-
sequential discharge. 52
In support of finding that Villegas violated the knowing
endangerment provision, the United States Attorney offered
testimony from Plaza Health Laboratory employees regard-
ing the caution with which blood was handled in the lab and
precautions taken to protect employees from exposure. For
example, prior to Villegas' promotion as co-owner and vice
president, between thirty-five to fifty of the blood specimens
brought into the laboratory were tested for Hepatitis-B in
separate areas specifically designated for testing tainted
blood. The laboratory often conducted a great deal of testing
for diseases such as Hepatitis and Leukemia. In addition,
148. Id. The Medical Waste Tracking Act (MWTA) was enacted within one
year of the Amendments to the CWA, which created the knowing endangerment
provision. The MWTA contained its own knowing endangerment provision, and
was used as a guide to determine the meaning of the CWA's knowing endanger-
ment provision. However, the MWTA's knowing endangerment provision was a
return to the "substantially certain" test espoused by RCRA, which was specifi-
cally rejected by Congress in its creating the knowing endangerment provision
of the CWA. The MWTA expired as of June 1991. See supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
149. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 13.
150. Id. See CWA § 309(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
151. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 13.
152. Id.
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Villegas co-authored the laboratory's safety manual which
outlined safety and health precautions to be followed by the
laboratory employees. 153
However, the district court determined that although the
defendant's acts were irresponsible, the evidence presented
failed to rise to the requisite level to prove that Villegas knew
that there was a high probability of placing others in immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily harm when he placed
the vials of blood into the Hudson River. 154 In doing so, the
district court relied upon the expert testimony of Dr. Alfred
Prince, a virologist, who testified that although there is a
high risk of disease if a broken piece of vial were to penetrate
a person's skin, the risk of that happening was very low.'
5 5
Furthermore, the district court noted that there was no show-
ing of Villegas' knowledge of tides and whether people walked
on the rocks where the vials of blood were hidden. 56 There-
fore, the district court found that although Villegas was a
point source, the evidence was insufficient to support a con-
viction under the knowing endangerment provision of the
CWA.15 7
C. United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit Decision 58
The question presented on appeal to the Second Circuit
was whether Villegas knowingly discharged pollutants from a
point source, or more succinctly stated: may a person be a
point source under the CWA?'5 9 The defendant contended
that the term "point source" fails to include discharges pro-
duced by the acts of people and, therefore, since the term is
ambiguous, the rule of lenity must reverse his conviction.'
60
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 14.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d 643.
159. Id. at 644.
160. Id.
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The government cross-appealed the district court's post-ver-
dict order acquitting Villegas of knowing endangerment. 16 1
1. Language and Structure of the Act
The Second Circuit determined that since "a discharge
from a point source" is fundamental for a knowing endanger-
ment violation, it does not have to address the government's
contentions regarding "imminent danger" until it is deter-
mined Villegas' discharges were from a point source.162 After
the court noted the definitions of the appropriate terms of the
CWA, the court determined that, as applied to the case at bar,
Villegas "'added' a 'pollutant' (human blood in glass vials) to
'navigable waters' (the Hudson River), and he did so without
a permit."16 3 Accordingly, the issue was whether Villegas'
conduct comprised a discharge which, in turn, is contingent
upon whether the addition of the vials into the Hudson River
was "from any point source."16 4 To determine the scope of the
term "point source," the court declared it first must consider
the language and the structure of the CWA.165
The Second Circuit began its analysis by declaring indi-
viduals are not among the specified list defining what a point
source may be.166 Whereas the enumerated terms in the defi-
nition of a point source are nonexclusive, the terms specified
in the definition elicit images of physical structures.167 More-
over, the court noted that if each and every discharge of a
pollutant from a person were considered a discharge from a
point source, the statutory definition of the term would have
been needless. 168
Furthermore, the court noted that if Congress desired to
classify a person as a point source, it could have easily done
so by enumerating the classification under the statute. 169
161. Id.
162. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 644-45.
163. Id. at 645.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 646.
166. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 646.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The court opined that the CWA's referral to industrial and
municipal dischargers is a reasonable emphasis, since indus-
trial and municipal polluters are the most prominent and se-
rious offenders of water quality.170 The Second Circuit
determined Congress did not intend to include people under
the CWA.171 To infer a person from the definition, the perti-
nent part of the statute would read as follows: "the addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any person by any
person shall be unlawful," and this statement obviously is
inane.172
2. Legislative History
The Second Circuit next focused on the legislative history
and the purposes of the CWA in "restor[ing] and main-
tain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters." 73 The court stated even if they were to
accept the CWA's purpose on its face, that purpose is merely
suggestive and, therefore, is not dispositive of the issue
presented before this court.174 Notwithstanding the fact that
the legislative history affords little acumen into the definition
of the term "point source," the history does focus on industrial
polluters. 75 NPDES permits, required by Congress for those
industrial polluters discharging from point sources, function
as a system of identifying polluters.' 76 Further, the defini-
tion of point source was included in the CWA to distinguish
between the specified conveyances and run-offs, and to re-
treat from the more general approach taken by the Rivers
and Harbors Act.177 Thus, Congress' intent was not to in-
170. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 646.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 648. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467. "It shall not be lawful to throw,
discharge or deposit ... any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a
liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 407.
See also S. REP. No. 414, supra note 13.
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clude random acts of people disposing of waste into navigable
waters, such as throwing candy wrappers into the water. 178
3. Case Law
The Second Circuit noted several cases where the point
source element of the CWA was established. 179 These cases
affirmed and, in some cases, broadened the types of point
sources enumerated under the CWA.180 However, the court
refused to "further the leap of writing a human being into the
statutory language."81 The court specifically relied upon
Earth Sciences, which held that the point source concept was
intended to further the permit scheme under the CWA by em-
bracing the extensive definition of a discernible conveyance
from which pollutants enter the water. 8 2
4. Regulatory Structure
Finally, the Second Circuit held that courts must give
great deference to the EPA's construction of the term "point
source" which includes discharging pollutants through pipes,
sewers, and other conveyances, and not "indirect discharg-
ers."18 3 Furthermore, the court noted that the CWA's legisla-
tive history fails to shed light upon this issue and that civil
cases, which broadly interpret the term, are not indicative of
a broad interpretation of criminal cases where Congress im-
posed heavier sanctions.'8 4 To do so would read the point
source element of the crime out of the statute. 8 5 Therefore,
the court concluded the application of "point source" to a
human being would be ambiguous. 8 6
178. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
179. Id. at 648.
180. Id. See supra notes 37-43, 45-46 and accompanying text.
181. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 648.
182. Id. at 648, noting Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
183. Id. at 649.
184. Id.
185. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 649.
186. Id.
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5. Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity in criminal cases only arises when am-
biguity is present. 87 It requires that ambiguity in a statute
be resolved in the defendant's favor. 188 This proposition
stands, due to the fact that courts are reluctant to punish an
individual as a criminal under federal law unless he "plainly
and unmistakenly" falls within the ambit of some provision of
a statute. 189 "The rule comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at
the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient
to wrongdoers." 9 0
The court in Plaza Health reasoned that reading the stat-
ute to include a human being as a point source was not con-
sistent with the legislative intent.' 9 ' Since the CWA's
criminal provisions did not clearly proscribe Villegas' con-
duct, the court held that the charges must be dismissed. This
is because under the rule of lenity, Villegas' conduct did not
fall within the ambit of the knowing endangerment provision,
nor did Congress expressly proscribe such conduct. 192 Ac-
cordingly, the court could not impute to the statute that
which Congress did not provide.
193
6. Knowing Endangerment
The Second Circuit dismissed the knowing endanger-
ment charge because it did not find that Villegas' discharges
derived from a point source enumerated under the CWA.
9 4
The court concluded that although there was a heinous char-
acter to the crime and a desirability to punish such an act,
the court must preserve the integrity of the CWA.
l s5
187. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 n.10 (1981).
188. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990).
189. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917).
190. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n.10, citing Callanan v. United States, 364
U.S. 587, 590 (1961).
191. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 649.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 650.
195. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 650.
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7. Second Circuit Dissent
In a convincing dissent, Justice Oakes stated that Ville-
gas' actions, as found by the jury, fell within the ambit of the
acts proscribed by the CWA. 196 Justice Oakes noted that the
point source definition embraces a variety of means for dis-
charging pollutants.197 Although the dissent recognized the
definition includes "classic" point sources such as pipes and
conduits, the term has also been broadly construed by differ-
ent courts, on numerous occasions, so long as the pollution
reached navigable waters by human efforts or was collected
by human efforts. 198
Next the dissent distinguished a point source from a
nonpoint source, noting the difference in modes of regula-
tion. 199 Such a difference is attributed to the fact that a point
source can be controlled at the source, cleaned up, and in
some instances cleaned up by the responsible party.20 0
Therefore, the dissent first stated that although Villegas'
acts were not a "classic" point source, his acts were more
closely related to a point source rather than a nonpoint
source discharge. 20 1 Further, the dissent noted the discharge
was directly into the water by Villegas, an identifiable source.
Thus, it was irrelevant to determine whether Villegas, the
car, the vials, or the bulkhead was the point source because
Villegas' acts functioned as a "discrete conveyance" or more
simply, a point source. 20 2
196. Id. For a full analysis on the issues raised by the dissent, discussing
why a human being can be considered a point source under the CWA, see Mark
J. Dorval, Note, Discharge of Pollutants into the Nation's Waters: What does the
CWA Prohibit?-United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643
(2d Cir. 1993), 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 121 (1994).
197. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 650-51.
198. Id. at 651. See supra notes 37-43, 45-46 and accompanying text.
199. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 652-53.
200. Id. at 653 (citations omitted).
201. Id. For a detailed discussion on nonpoint sources, see Daniel R.
Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it be Done?, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 479 (1989).
202. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 653.
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The dissent focused on the fact that the pollution's source
was identifiable and could have been controlled.20 3 The
CWA's goal is the elimination of discharges, regardless of the
method of waste disposal.20 4 Justice Oakes remarked, "I
doubt that Congress would have regarded an army of men
and women throwing industrial waste from trucks into a
stream as exempt from the statute."20
5
[T]here are also dangers to paying too little attention to
such broad stated goals. While the Clean Water Act may
not always live up to its grand ambitions, in particular by
setting definitional limits on what it covers (only pollution,
only point sources), its ambitious goals are nonetheless
useful interpretive guides: they indicate that, all other
things being equal, a generous rather than a cramped in-
terpretation of the statute is more likely to be what Con-
gress intended. 206
The dissent next focused its argument on the majority's
suggestion that a person can never be a point source due to
linguistic variables which would read in part, "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from a person by a per-
203. Id. It is reasonable to assume that Villegas was aware that there were
other methods available for controlling the discharge and that the blood was
extremely dangerous for casual discharges, since his laboratory hired profes-
sional medical waste handlers. Id.
204. Id. at 653-54.
205. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654.
Since the Act contains no exemption for de minimis violations-
since, indeed, many Clean Water Act prosecutions are for a series of
small discharges, each of which is treated as a single violation-I
cannot see that one man throwing one day's worth of medical waste
into the ocean differs (and indeed, with this type of pollution, it
might be that only a few days' violations could be proven even if the
laboratory regularly relied on Villegas to dispose of its waste by
throwing it into the ocean). A different reading would encourage
corporations perfectly capable of abiding by the Clean Water Act's
requirements to ask their employees to stand between the company
trucks and the sea, thereby transforming point source pollution
(dumping from trucks) into nonpoint source pollution (dumping by
hand). Such a method is controllable, easily identifiable, and
inexcusable.
Id. at 654.
206. Id. at 654 n.5.
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son."20 7 The oddness of this sentence disappears, however,
because word placement of "any" preceding "person" and
"point source" suggests broad constructions of the words. 208
"When a company chooses to use the [NIation's waters as a
dumpsite for waste it has created and gathered in a manage-
able place, it should ask for a permit or face prosecution."20 9
Under such a construction, a person may be subject to
criminal penalties consisting of up to a $25,000 fine or three
years in jail for intentionally throwing a candy wrapper into
the ocean. 210 This analysis is contrary to congressional in-
tent since the CWA focuses on dischargers of industrial and
municipal waste, not individual litterers. 21' Furthermore,
there were no factual disputes, and the jury found Villegas
did not place the pollutants into the Hudson River.21 2
The dissent also refuted the majority's application of the
rule of lenity to the present situation, doubting any ambigu-
ity in the CWA with respect to an individual physically depos-
iting medical waste into navigable water.21 3 The dissent
noted that only where a reasonable doubt exists in a statute's
207. Id. at 654.
208. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654. The dissent exemplifies how such a con-
struction would read:
• .. the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters by an em-
ployee's throwing them there (a person acting as a point source) at
the instruction of his or her employer (a corporation, or person ca-
pable of being held responsible) .... More specifically, the sentence
could refer to an individual hired to convey, by hand, all of a corpo-
ration's toxic wastes from the company's back door to the Missis-
sippi River, three feet away (the point source), by that individual
and by the corporation which authorized the disposal (the potential
defendants).
Id.
209. Id. at 655. The dissent believed that a person can be a point source
(when a person directly dumps waste into the water) or a nonpoint source
(when a person spreads fertilizer on the ground so that it may be washed into
nearby waters). Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 654 n.6.
210. Id. at 655.
211. Id. The CWA does not apply not only to major dischargers of industrial
and municipal waste as read by the statutory definition, which uses the word
"any" prior to "addition," "point source," "pollutant," and "discharge," indicating
congressional intent to bar all violations, including minor ones. Id. at 655 n.8.
212. Id. at 655.
213. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 655.
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intent should a court utilize the rule of lenity: "I think it is
plain enough that Congress intended the statute to bar cor-
porate officers from disposing of corporate waste into naviga-
ble waters by hand as well as by pipe."214 Finally, the dissent
concurred with the majority with respect to the knowing en-
dangerment counts, since the government experts agreed the
risk that a person would be harmed by the Hepatitis-B in-
fected blood was quite low. 215
IV. Analysis
The Plaza Health court could have found at least five
point sources which discharged the pollutants: (1) the
container(s), (2) the vials, (3) the bulkhead, (4) the car, and
(5) a human body. Since the legislative history and statutory
provisions give little guidance to the point source interpreta-
tion, the Second Circuit, along with other courts, should look
to the general approach of the CWA as a whole, including its
objectives, policy, and statutory language, to effectuate the
goals of the statute.
The district court and Judge Oakes' dissent from the Sec-
ond Circuit correctly held Villegas criminally liable under the
CWA. Nowhere in the transcript does it establish that Ville-
gas applied for and obtained a permit. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment clearly established a violation of NPDES under the
CWA because prosecutors established that Villegas (1) dis-
charged (2) a pollutant (blood) (3) into navigable waters
(Hudson River) (4) from a point source (5) without a dis-
charge permit. Thus, the single questionable issue was
whether the vials of blood were discharged by a point source.
A. Point Source
First, the containers in which Villegas placed the vials of
blood are enumerated under the definition of point source in
the CWA.2 16 There is no requirement that a point source
214. Id. at 656.
215. Id.
216. "[Any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
10911996]
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need be directly adjacent to the water it pollutes. 217 Simi-
larly, pollutants need not be discharged directly into naviga-
ble waters.218
A "point source" is "any discernable, confined and dis-
crete conveyance."219 The classic point source is usually envi-
sioned as a pipe which is a permanent physical structure.220
Although the CWA's definition of point source includes physi-
cal structures such as a pipe, the definition specifically states
"including, but not limited to."22 1 Despite the fact that a
container is not a permanent, physical structure placed in or
near a body of water, Congress specifically enumerated it to
be a point source.222 Although no case law exists recognizing
a container as a point source, Congress' intent is clear in this
area. Therefore, the district court and the Second Circuit
should have held that the containers were point sources.
Similarly, the vials which contained blood are point
sources. A vial falls within the definition of a container.
Some of the vials found along the shore by school children
were cracked, indicating the likeliness that some of the blood
escaped from these vials. In this situation, the vials, which
were linked to Plaza Health Laboratories, were the objects
which introduced or conveyed the human blood, some of
which was infectious, into the Hudson River.
A vial is a small container, an object specifically listed in
the point source definition. Furthermore, these vials were
originally placed in containers, an object enumerated under
the point source definition. 223 The vial/container holds and/or
bounds within its limits a pollutant. Moreover, once the
vial(s) break, it essentially becomes a point source from
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged ...." CWA
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
217. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
220. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 651. See supra notes 37-43, 45-46 and accompa-
nying text.
221. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
222. Id. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
223. Id.
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which the pollutant is introduced into the water. Thus, the
vials were clearly point sources.
Third, the rocks forming the bulkhead where the con-
tainers were placed by Villegas are also a point source. As
the district court noted, the rocks forming the bulkhead con-
stitute a "discrete fissure(s)" enumerated under the CWA.224
A fissure is a "narrow opening or crack ... occurring from
some breaking or parting."225 Other physical structures,
such as culverts 226 and ditches, 227 have also been found to be
point sources. These structures are not functionally different
than the bulkhead in the Villegas case. Therefore, the dis-
trict court and Second Circuit should have held the bulkhead
as a point source under a strict statutory construction of the
CWA.
Villegas' car, which transported the pollutants, also
could have been deemed a point source in Plaza Health. On
numerous occasions, courts have held that airplanes, bulldoz-
ers, dump trucks, and ships are point sources. 228 Likewise,
floating craft and rolling stock, both mobile objects, are listed
under the point source definition. 229 Thus, it is logical to hold
a car as a point source. Although airplanes, dump trucks,
ships, etc., directly convey or channel the pollutants into nav-
igable waters, unlike the car in this situation, pollutants do
not have to be discharged directly into navigable waters. 230
Furthermore, the term "point source" has been interpreted
broadly to apply to literally thousands of pollution sources.231
Therefore, the car was clearly a point source.
Lastly, Villegas should have been deemed a point source.
Although a person is not enumerated under the point source
definition, the definition does not bar it. Contemplating
224. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 10.
225. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (8th ed. 1979).
226. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1355.
227. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1401 (D. N.H.
1985).
228. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
229. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). See also supra note 67 and accom-
panying text.
230. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 48, 59-64, 68-71 and accompanying text.
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thousands of pollution sources, Congress purposely phrased
the term "point source" broadly. Congress did so by using the
words "including but not limited to" in the CWA. Likewise,
numerous cases have supported a broad interpretation of a
"point source."232 A restriction placed on the definition would
be unrealistic, if not altogether impossible. Courts should
look to the general approach of a statute as a whole, including
its objectives, policy and statutory language. Upon doing so,
it is clear that a human being can be considered a point
source.
The Second Circuit's argument that a person cannot be
properly read into the definition of "point source" is unwar-
ranted. The court stated the statute would read, "the addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source by any person shall be unlawful."233 However, the
term "any", before "person" and "point source", hints at a
broad interpretation of the word. 234 The court noted the sen-
tence could refer to a person hired to convey by hand pollu-
tants into a navigable body of water which is a couple of feet
away from the company. 235 Also, the person could refer to an
employer or a corporation.236 "The test should be whether
the term fits the meaning and the purpose of the statute, not
whether the term would fit the sentence."237
Congress sought to target industrial and municipal pol-
luters to restore the bodily integrity of the Nation's waters by
implementing the CWA.238 Although Congress gave little in-
sight into the term "point source," it is clear that Villegas'
acts constituted the types of discharges which Congress
sought to prevent. Furthermore, Congress purposely phrased
"point source" broadly by including the words "including but
not limited to," and numerous cases have supported a broad
interpretation of "point source." Villegas was part of an in-
232. Id.
233. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 647.
234. Id. at 654.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Dorval, supra note 177, at 136.
238. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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dustry as he and his company worked with infectious blood,
which is considered a pollutant under the CWA.
Although Congress was concerned about finding people
who merely throw a candy wrapper into the water criminally
liable under the CWA, this situation will not happen if the
courts recognize people as point sources. It is improbable
that Congress sought to fine an individual who throws a
candy wrapper into the water $25,000. On the other hand, it
seems quite clear that Villegas' conduct was the type of action
that Congress sought to prevent and/or punish: a representa-
tive of a corporation/industry. If all the requirements for a
discharge of pollutants are met, the "person" should be sub-
ject to criminal liability. This should hold true regardless of
whether it is an individual, corporation, or corporate officer,
because each element has been satisfied.
A human body is not a permanent structure, in the sense
that it is not fixed next to a body of water, which is typically
envisioned under the CWA. However, neither are dump
trucks, airplanes nor ships.239 Thus, deeming a person a
point source is a logical extension of the term.
Dump trucks, airplanes and ships are all transitory ob-
jects, as is a human being. Villegas was adjacent to the water
when he "conveyed" the pollutants into the water. Further-
more, he is identifiable, he directly discharged the pollutants
into the navigable waters, and he controlled the conveyance.
Congress intended the statute to prohibit corporate officers
from disposing pollutants by hand and by pipe. Thus, by fol-
lowing the circuits' trend in broadly construing a point
source, it is logical to extend a point source to include a
human being.
This trend is inevitable. Such an interpretation suggests
the statute is not ambiguous and, therefore, the rule of lenity
is not applicable to this case. The Second Circuit's refusal to
treat a person as a point source, by virtue of the rule of lenity,
is without merit.
239. See supra notes 71, 74 and accompanying text.
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B. Knowing Endangerment
The district court, in holding that a human body is a
point source, also held that Villegas was not liable under the
knowing endangerment provision of the CWA.240 The evi-
dence clearly established that Villegas was aware of the dan-
gers and risks involved in disposing Hepatitis-B infected
blood into the Hudson River and, therefore, the district court
erred when it refused to find Villegas liable under the know-
ing endangerment provision.
The knowing endangerment provision provides that an
individual is liable if he "knows at that time he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury."241 This provision includes placing another in a
substantial risk of death.242 In such a situation, the person is
held responsible for actual awareness or the actual belief that
he possessed. Moreover, the use of circumstantial evidence is
permissible to establish the requisite mens rea.243
Here, the vials of infected blood are medical waste which,
under EPA standards, "contains pathogens with sufficient
virulence and quantity so that exposure to the waste by a sus-
ceptible host could result in infectious disease" or "waste ca-
pable of producing infectious disease."244 It has been argued
that medical waste-related injuries are unlikely to be a con-
cern when regarding Hepatitis-B infected blood due to the
fact that the virus must live inside a living cell in order to
multiply.245 However, the removal from a living cell can
cause viral numbers to remain constant or decline. 246 Thus,
even though viral numbers will never increase outside a liv-
ing cell, the virus will continue to survive. If the children
who found the broken vials accidentally cut themselves with
the glass, they could have been exposed to Hepatitis-B. This
virus is known to cause inflammation of the liver and, ulti-
240. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 14.
241. CWA § 309(c)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 309(c)(3)(B)(i)(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(I).
244. Battle, supra note 4, at 524.
245. Id. at 534.
246. Id.
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mately, death.247 Such a risk, no matter how great or small,
is unwarranted.
The facts elicited of Plaza Health establish that Villegas
had the requisite intent to be convicted under the knowing
endangerment provision. Testimony indicated Villegas
worked in the laboratory handling the blood and took the req-
uisite precautions to protect himself from exposure. 248 Be-
tween thirty-five and fifty of the blood specimens brought into
the laboratory were tested for Hepatitis in specifically desig-
nated areas for testing tainted blood due to its inherent
risks.249 The laboratory continually conducted testing for dis-
eases like Hepatitis and Leukemia. 250 Furthermore, Villegas
co-authored the laboratory's safety manual followed by its
employees, which included guidelines for handling the
blood.251 Finally, Villegas was aware that there were other
methods available for controlling the discharge since his labo-
ratory hired professional medical waste handlers. 252
When viewed in totality, this evidence establishes Ville-
gas knew or should have known he placed others in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury. Although expert tes-
timony revealed that the risk of disease from a broken piece
of vial glass penetrating one's skin was low, 2 5 3 this testimony
is irrelevant. What is relevant is Villegas' knowledge when
he discharged the vials of infected blood in the water. Fur-
thermore, the later determination that only five vials of blood
found on each occasion were infected is also irrelevant. It
does not matter how much of the blood was infected. What
does matter is that some blood was infected. Nowhere in the
case does it state that Villegas knew how much of the blood
was infected. Villegas admitted to the illegal discharges,
blaming lack of laboratory space for incoming samples as the
reason for discharging the infectious medical waste.254 Thus,
247. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
248. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 13.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 653.
253. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 14.
254. Id. at 7.
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the district court incorrectly focused on the potential risk of
contact with the infected blood and not Villegas' knowledge.
It is reasonable to assume that, as vice president and co-
owner of Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., Villegas was aware
that Hepatitis-B infected blood passed through the laborato-
ries. Further, it is reasonable to assume that due to the
above mentioned facts, especially the fact that his laboratory
hired professional medical waste handlers, Villegas knew or
should have known that some of the blood was or could have
been tainted. Thus, both the district court and the Second
Circuit should have determined that Villegas was liable
under the knowing endangerment provision.
The knowing endangerment provision provides that cir-
cumstantial evidence is permissible to prove a defendant's
possession of actual knowledge; it can be used to establish
actual awareness or belief.255 Here, the amount of evidence
is so overwhelming and points to one conclusion: Villegas
knew that the blood was infected. In turn, this proves that
Villegas knew he was placing others in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm.
The legislative history states that the pertinent language
was left out of the CWA because of the language's tendency to
deter prosecutions and, therefore, the provision should be
measured according to the prevailing case law.256 Unfortu-
nately, the prevailing case law is vague. Only two other
cases, not including Villegas or Plaza Health, refer to this
provision, both failing to apply or further define the provi-
sion. 257 Thus, since there is no set standard to use as a guide-
line under this provision, it cannot be established that a
discharger violated the knowing endangerment provision
without utilizing circumstantial evidence to establish such a
violation.
The evidence in the Plaza Health case is overwhelmingly
convincing. All of this evidence points to one conclusion: Vil-
legas was well aware that some of the blood he dumped into
255. CWA § 309 (c)(3)(B)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(3)(B)(i).
256. See supra note 83-84 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the Hudson River was infected with a deadly virus. Fortu-
nately, none of the children who found the broken vials along
the shore were injured. If there were reports of injury, the
outcome of this case would most likely be different.
V. Conclusion
It is important to hold Villegas liable in order to effectu-
ate the goals of the CWA. Even though he dumped infectious
medical waste into the Hudson River on two noted occasions,
it is unclear as to whether Villegas would have continued to
dump the blood. Villegas stated that he dumped the blood in
order to make room for the incoming blood.258 Such disposal
should not have occurred. Further, he was well aware of the
risks involved in disposing the infected blood in the Hudson
River.
The fact that the discharges were minor is irrelevant.
Even minor discharges hinder the CWA's ability "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and bodily integrity of
the Nation's waters."259 The CWA's definition of "discharge of
pollutants" refer to "any addition of any pollutant to naviga-
ble waters from any point source."260 Thus it was clearly
Congress' intent to punish all dischargers, regardless of
quantity. To hold otherwise would be minimizing the goals
behind the implementation of the CWA of restoring and
maintaining the bodily integrity of the waters of the United
States. Furthermore, the CWA clearly states that noncompli-
ance with the Act's provisions subjects the violator to crimi-
nal or civil penalties. 261
From a medical waste perspective, finding Villegas liable
is also important since the CWA is one of a few federal stat-
utes under which the illegal disposal of medical waste can be
prosecuted.262 The CWA not only protects the integrity of
water, but also prevents beach wash-ups of medical waste
since there is no federal law dealing primarily with the dispo-
258. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. at 7.
259. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
260. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
261. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
262. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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sal of medical waste. The high-risk nature of infectious medi-
cal waste should make prosecution for noncompliance
attractive.
Paying too little attention to the broad stated goals of the
CWA, as exemplified by the Second Circuit, threatens our Na-
tion's waters. Now, under such a reading, Mr. Peter Polluter,
CEO of Nukem Nuclear Power Plant, can consolidate a small
quantity of excess uranium 235 from his plant, place this ex-
cess in containers, drive off in his Mercedes to the base of the
Tappan Zee Bridge and, by hand, throw some of the contain-
ers in the Hudson River and/or place some of the containers
in a crevice along the shore, knowing that he will not be pros-
ecuted under the CWA due to the Plaza Health decision. It is
hard to decipher a difference between the above scenario and
a scenario where, for example, a dump truck dumps toxic
waste into the Hudson River or where a pipe, connected to a
building, conveys toxic waste into the river. In all of the
above scenarios, there is an illegal discharge of a pollutant
from a point source into navigable waters of the United
States, tampering with the bodily integrity of the Hudson
River. The CWA was specifically implemented to prevent
these types of occurrences: discharges from industrial and
municipal origins. Although the above hypothetical sounds
extreme, under Plaza Health, it is permissible. Plaza Health
has drawn the magic line until the case is overruled.
The Plaza Health court failed to find that either the
container(s), the vials, the bulkhead, the car, or a human
body, was a point source that discharged pollutants. The Sec-
ond Circuit neglected to follow its own precedent, and that of
other circuits, by declining to extend the definition of a point
source. Also, the Second Circuit failed to recognize the other
sources in the case which were specifically enumerated under
the CWA. Furthermore, the court should have held Villegas
criminally liable under the knowing endangerment provision.
Since the legislative history and statutory provision give lit-
tle guidance to the point source interpretation, the Second
Circuit, along with other courts, should look to the general
approach of the CWA as a whole, including its objectives, pol-
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icy and statutory language, to effectuate the goals of the
statute.
If the point of the CWA is to deter and punish violators, it
is ludicrous to wait around until someone comes in contact
with infectious medical waste to convict an illegal discharger.
Until Plaza Health is overruled, it will continue to be a loaded
gun on the verge of firing.
39
